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Abstract
Consider an individual whose preferences are changing over time. How
do we assess her welfare? We argue that this is an empirically relevant
question as preferences are constantly changing over time if the agent has a
bias towards the present. We present a simple example where preferences
are changing over time (the apple tree) and use it to aid our discussion
of welfare. We critically assess the approach that focuses on the decision
maker (revealed preference) and the one that ignores the decision maker
(long-run self) with reference to some recent literature. Finally, we look at
some of the problems that arise when we consider a sovereign individual
who aggregates her changing preferences.
1 Introduction
How do you assess the welfare of an individual? The answer of course will depend
on what is meant by the term welfare. It could for example refer to the level of
happiness. This would require a well defined concept of happiness and a method
for measuring it. Needless to say, this is no simple task. Economists have
adopted a concept that is well defined, normatively appealing and that allows
us to avoid diﬃcult philosophical questions. We link an individual’s welfare to
her preferences and consider relative welfare rather than levels of welfare. If
x is preferred to y then the individual is better oﬀ with x relative to y or her
welfare is greater with x than it is with y. Preferences are ascertained through
observations of choices. If x is chosen rather than y then x is preferred to y. All
that remains to have a well defined concept of welfare is the requirement that
preferences and choices are consistent. Diﬃcult social and moral judgements
are resolved by the individual and her wellbeing is linked to her resolution of
possibly conflicting (inner) objectives. At the heart of the methodology is the
sovereignty of the individual in determining her welfare.
We will focus on a conceptual diﬃculty that arises when preferences are
changing over time. We will ignore other methodological questions that arise
by assuming that preferences are known. The conceptual problem that arises
is simple, we do not have a coherent set of preferences that we can link to
welfare. We will begin by arguing that this is an empirically relevant question.
In section 2 we argue that temporal preferences are always changing over time.
A methodology that ignores this is fundamentally flawed. In section 3 we present
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a simple example where preferences are changing over time. With the aid of
this example we look at whether we can maintain the conceptual link between a
sovereign individual and welfare in section 4. Our arguments can be summarised
as follows.
The revealed preference approach focuses on the decision maker and assumes
that preferences are stationary over time. The shortcomings are obvious when
applied to an example where preferences are changing. We also note a method-
ological problem with this approach, if choices are consistent over time we can
neither falsify nor verify the hypothesis that preferences are stationary from
observations of choices.
At the other extreme is an approach that ignores the decision maker and
focuses instead on the preferences of the long-run self stripped of the short-term
impulses that give rise to the intertemporal conflict. We argue that since the
short-term self is ever present, we cannot simply ignore these impulses if we are
to have a meaningful concept of welfare. We give an example where doing so
gives a welfare maximising allocation that is not even Pareto eﬃcient.
Finally, we consider the possibility of using the preferences of a temporally
impartial higher self who aggregates the changing preferences. Here we identify
another problem, the history dependence of preferences and beliefs. There is no
sovereign individual who can compare alternative possible belief systems that
arise from diﬀerent histories as any such judgement requires beliefs. Without
an invariable self, we cannot appeal to individual sovereignty to determine what
is best for an individual.
2 Temporal Preferences
It is not uncommon for us to consider a past decision with regret. In many
cases, the past decision was simply a mistake. If you could do it all again,
you would revise your decision. There are also cases where there is a conflict
between how you view the past decision now and how you viewed it when it was
taken. If you could do it all again, you would not revise your decision. In the
first case there is temporal consistency in the view that some other action would
have been better for the individual. In this paper, we consider the second case
where there is a conflict. A moment’s reflection reveals the conflict. Consider
the most painful episode, say a head-ache or stomach-ache that you have ever
had. You are faced with the following hypothetical choice. You can have this
episode now or you can delay it for 20 years, you must choose one or the other.
You are to imagine that it is certain that you will still be alive in 20 years
and to avoid complications arising from anticipation, if you choose the latter,
the fact that you will have this episode in the future will be wiped from your
memory. I prefer to delay it for 20 years. Now consider the choice, episode
now or 20 years ago. This requires little reflection, I prefer to have had it 20
years ago. No doubt that I will also express this preference in 20 years (over the
painful episode then or now). There is a clear inconsistency which arises from
the fact that my evaluation of a choice now depends on how I will experience the
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consequences of that choice now. Knowledge that I will experience this episode
in the future or the memory of having experienced it in the past is not the
same as experiencing it now. The same is true of pleasures. This gives rise to a
bias towards the present. We will call this present bias. Should the individual
resolve the inconsistency that arises from present bias? There is no internal
inconsistency as these preferences are diﬀerent at diﬀerent points in time. The
preferences are simply changing and at any point in time the individual chooses
the most preferred alternative.
This view is captured by Shackle’s term a moment-in-being.1 At a moment-
in-being the individual will have a memory of the past and expectations of the
future. Her perceptions and anticipations will be shaped by her history. Any
decision that she is faced with will be viewed from this unique and distinct posi-
tion and her actions will be based on how she will experience the consequences
of those actions now.2
We have used the term temporal preferences to refer to an individual’s rank-
ing of all lifetime alternatives. There seems to be some confusion on what
constitutes changing preferences. There may be aspects to an individual’s pref-
erences that are not changing over time. For example, in a choice between
consuming x today or consuming y today she may always choose the former.
Although this gives us useful information about an individual’s preferences, it
does not tell us that preferences are stationary. It may be insightful to consider
the following example which appears in the literature. An individual alternates
daily between eating fish and red meat for dinner. The example has been used
because there is a simple sense in which her preferences are changing (one day
she prefers to eat fish the next red meat) and are stationary (conditional on
red meat yesterday she always prefers fish today and vice versa). However, we
do not know whether her preferences are stationary. It seems more reasonable
to imagine that they are not. It may be the case that she prefers a history
where she has had fish for the last six days and is having red meat today to one
where she has been alternating between fish and red meat. Even if we suppose
something like her satisfactions today depend only on yesterday’s consumption,
she may always prefer to be at a point in the cycle where she is having red meat
today.
3 The Apple Tree
Isaac lives for three periods and consumes only apples from the apple tree in
his garden. An apple tree An ∈ A, is characterised by a distribution of apples
(a1, a2, a3) where ai is the number of apples produced in period i and a1 +
a2 + a3 = 100. Apples cannot be stored from one period to the next and there
1Shackle [7]
2Parfit [4] (part two) also presents a compelling case in favour of the idea that we take
decisions that are in our present best interest (rather than the prevailing assumption that we
take decisions that are in our long-term self interest).
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are no markets where Isaac can buy or sell apples. Isaac’s apple tree is A1 =
(3313 , 33
1
3 , 33
1
3) which by assumption he cannot change. He does nevertheless,
have preferences over apple trees. In period 2, his most preferred tree is A2 =
(30.916, 38.168, 30.916) and his preferences over apple trees can be represented
by the utility function
U2(a1, a2, a3) = 0.9
√
a1 +
√
a2 + 0.9
√
a3. (1)
Given that we know his preferences, can there be any objection to us-
ing (1) to represent Isaac’s welfare? Well, shouldn’t the apple tree A3 =
(30.916, 30.916, 38.168) be welfare equivalent to A2? The normative basis for
such a welfare criterion is simply that there should be temporal neutrality in
assessing consumption paths. The problem with this is that it ignores Isaac’s
preferences. Given that Isaac himself would choose A2, what position is anyone
else in to tell him that he would be just as well oﬀ with A3. The same criticism
will apply to any normative statement concerning Isaac’s welfare that ignores
his preferences. However, what if Isaac prefers A3 to A2 in period 3? This is
where we run into a conceptual problem. There is a conflict between the period
2 self and period 3 self which makes it impossible to link welfare directly to pref-
erences. Suppose that Isaac’s preferences in periods 1 and 3 can be represented
by the utility functions
U1(a1, a2, a3) =
√
a1 + 0.9
√
a2 + 0.81
√
a3, (2)
U3(a1, a2, a3) = 0.81
√
a1 + 0.9
√
a2 +
√
a3. (3)
His most preferred trees are A4 = (40.550, 32.845, 26.605) in period 1 and A5 =
(26.605, 32.845, 40.550) in period 3.We wish to address the very simple question
of how we evaluate Isaac’s welfare over the 3 periods. More generally, we want
to look at welfare when preferences are changing over time. We will begin
by anticipating some objections that the reader may have with this example.
Firstly, is there any sense in considering preferences over the past? Time after all
is irreversible! This does not prevent us from having preferences over what might
have been. One diﬃculty with this is that we may be mistaken about how we
would feel now with a diﬀerent history given that we have not experienced that
history. We suppose that in periods 2 and 3, Isaac is able to imagine perfectly
how he feels about a parallel life where he has consumed a diﬀerent number
of apples in the past. Furthermore, his preferences are not history dependent.
Secondly, it is apparent from Isaac’s utility functions that he discounts the
past just as he discounts the future. The rationale for discounting the future
is that agents are presently biased. Wouldn’t it be ludicrous to imagine that
a presently biased agent attaches increasing weight into the past? Temporal
consistency requires that an agent does this at the same rate that she discounts
the future. In fact, the idea that a presently biased agent may discount the past
as well as the future seems so compelling, that it is a surprise that very few
authors have looked at its consequences.3 Finally, we have no way of identifying
3Caplin and Leahy ([1]) argue that under such circumstances, a policy maker should use a
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preferences that relate to the past. This may be true. However, even if we had
complete knowledge of preferences, we would have a conceptual problem with
welfare.
4 Welfare
We now turn to the simple question posed in the last section. How do we
evaluate Isaac’s welfare over the 3 periods.
4.1 The Decision maker
We can focus our attention on the decision maker. This approach recognizes
that the knowledge we have of an individual’s preferences arises from choice. We
can be sure that the decision maker is acting in her self interest so we should use
the preferences revealed through her behaviour to evaluate her welfare. If her
choices are consistent then it is not possible to falsify the claim that preferences
are stationary over time through observations of her choices. However, it is not
possible to verify this hypothesis either.
Isaac in the example makes no decision and so we have no choice behav-
iour to base welfare on. To analyse the decision maker approach, imagine the
introduction of a market for apples that eﬀectively allows Isaac to choose any
apple tree in a given period subject to the constraint that he cannot change past
consumption. We observe the following, in period 1 Isaac chooses to consume
40.550 apples. We also observe from the contracts that he has entered into,
that he plans to consume 32.845 apples in period 2 and 26.605 in period 3. We
can deduce from this that his most preferred tree is A4. In periods 2 and 3 he
chooses not to change his previous plans. This behaviour is consistent with the
hypothesis that A4 is always the most preferred tree. If A4 is the most preferred
tree then we can comfortably proclaim that it maximises welfare. However we
cannot logically deduce that A4 maximises welfare as the hypothesis that pref-
erences are stationary has not been verified. In fact, in this case, we know it to
be false.
The problem lies with the as if approach to utility. This approach has al-
lowed economists to build a coherent theory of consumer choice. The theory
relies only on consistency and this makes it remarkably versatile. If it appears
that preferences are inconsistent then we can look for consistency in the incon-
sistency. Once we have consistency, we can hypothesize a utility function that is
consistent with choice and model behaviour as if maximising utility. If we want
to link welfare to preferences however, we need to know what preferences are.
It is not correct to say that the agent acts as if to maximise U1 and therefore
his welfare can be represented by U1. Gul and Pesendorfer [2] provide a recent
example of this. They extend the standard methodology to resolve apparent
discount rate that is less than that of private citizens. Ray and Wang ([6]) consider an agent
whose consumption decision at time t depends on a weighted average of his current utility
and that of a future self who discounts past consumption.
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inconsistencies in choice when agents have to deal with temptations. The indi-
vidual acts as if she maximises a utility function and the model makes testable
predictions about behaviour. However, this consistency is then used to make
the link with welfare. Whilst as before the consistency can be used to support
the hypothesis that preferences are not changing over time, it does not verify
it. Let us take their simple example. Consider an individual who succumbs to
the tempting alternative c0 if it is included in the menu from which she makes
a choice but would rather not have it included in the menu. This gives rise to
the following preferences over menus c Â (c, c0) ∼ c0. If she could commit to a
menu prior to making the consumption choice then she would choose the menu
c. Suppose that these preferences (over menus) do not change over time and
consider this individual over 3 periods. She must make a consumption choice
in period 2. If she could commit in period 1 then there is consistency in the
view that c0 should be removed from the menu. Suppose she cannot commit
in period 1. Then she will choose the tempting alternative in period 2. Is this
welfare maximising? Well we can hypothesize that the period 1 self and the
period 3 self also prefer for the period 2 self to choose c0. This however, cannot
be falsified or verified from the decision maker’s choice alone. We do not observe
the preferences of the other selves in this respect. It may be the case that the
period 3 self sympathises suﬃciently with the period 2 self’s predicament that
she does indeed prefer her to choose c0. However, one can imagine that a period
3 self who has to deal with the consequences of the period 2 choice would much
rather she chose c in period 2. Given this possible conflict, we need to be sure
that it is reasonable to assume that it doesn’t arise in proposed applications.4
4.2 The Long-Run Self
You are to imagine an individual stripped of her short term impulses that are
the root cause of intertemporal conflict. We can use her preferences to eval-
uate welfare. This approach is at the other extreme, the decision makers are
completely ignored!
O’Donoghue and Rabin for example [5] consider a model where an agent dis-
counts utility hyperbolically. With these preferences, the intertemporal conflict
is apparent in her inconsistent choices. They assume that the long-run self dis-
counts utility exponentially! It is not clear why the long-run self would have any
bias towards the present. One defence is to claim that we can consider a period
0 self who has these preferences. If temporal preferences are changing over time
then the normative basis for using the period 0 preferences is dubious.5
4Gul and Pesendorfer [3] for example apply this method to addiction. They suggest that a
price rise of an addictive drug will reduce welfare. Implicit in their argument is the assumption
that preferences (over decisions) do not change. This assumption is particularly implausible
when we are dealing with a decision that gives immediate pleasure but entails harmful long-
term consequences.
5We should point out that their analysis does not depend on making this assumption on
welfare, rather it depends simply on intertemporal conflict. They argue that given there is
intertemporal conflict, we should not rule out paternalistic intervention.
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Let us take seriously the idea that at every point in time there is a dual self,
one with long term interests that are constant over time and the other with
preferences that are biased towards the present. How do we resolve the conflict
of the two selves in evaluating the individual’s welfare at each point in time?
Well is there any reason to question the way the dual self resolves these issues.
Given any decision she makes is her resolution of these competing interests it
seems reasonable to maintain the link between her preferences and her welfare
at that point in time. Using the long-run self however ignores her own resolution
of the conflict at each point in time and imposes the long-run self’s preferences.
To see the perils of this consider Isaac and the Apple Tree with the following
preferences
U1(a1, a2, a3) =
√
a1 + 0.9
√
a2 + 0.1
√
a3,
U2(a1, a2, a3) = 0.9
√
a1 +
√
a2 + 0.9
√
a3
U3(a1, a2, a3) = 0.1
√
a1 + 0.9
√
a2 +
√
a3
You can imagine that the long-run self’s preferences are represented by
√
a1 +√
a2 +
√
a3 and the short-run self cares only about this period and neighbor-
ing periods. The above preferences represent Isaac’s resolution to the con-
flict. Using the long-run self’s preferences, the welfare maximising tree is A1 =
(3313 , 33
1
3 , 33
1
3). It doesn’t take much reflection to see that this is not even Pareto
eﬃcient! If we transfer 1 apple from period 1 and one from period 3 to period
2 then all three decision makers are better oﬀ. This example is admittedly
contrived. It is designed to illustrate in the most extreme way possible that a
welfare criterion that ignores short term impulses is deeply flawed. The same
problem arises if we use higher order preferences to evaluate welfare. Suppose
that Isaac has the higher order preference in favour of the long-run self. That
is, he has the higher order preference to prefer A1 to any other tree in every
period. It remains the case in this example that A1 is not even Pareto eﬃcient.6
More generally, the short-term self is ever present and giving into impulses
must be satisfying in some way. Is there any reason for ignoring these satis-
factions. Perhaps it is the negative long term consequences. This, however,
suggests that we need to consider the aggregate eﬀect of a decision.
4.3 Aggregating Preferences
We can imagine the individual rising above her temporal position and evaluating
all life-time plans. If these preferences are stationary then we can return to the
methodology that links preferences with welfare. Crucially, there is a sense in
which we will have maintained the individual’s sovereignty over determining her
welfare. We will refer to the temporally impartial individual as the higher self7
6That is not to say that higher order preferences are not important. They will have a role
to play in shaping first-order preferences and any dissonance may have an impact on the level
of welfare.
7The long-run self is also temporally impartial! We have argued that if we are to have
a meaningful concept of welfare, we cannot separate welfare from the decision maker who is
the subject of experience. The higher self is to be thought of as considering every subject of
experience impartially.
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and to her beliefs/preferences as higher beliefs/preferences.8 Returning to the
example in section 3, suppose that higher Isaac has preferences represented by
the (utilitarian) utility function
U(a1, a2, a3) = 2.71
√
a1 + 2.8
√
a2 + 2.71
√
a3.
We then have an answer to our question, of all the apple trees, the best tree for
Isaac is A6 = (32.597, 34.801, 32.597). There are alas many diﬃculties with this
approach. Leaving aside the practical problem of how we are ever to know what
these preferences are, we have only come upon a solution by supposing a solution
to exist. Is it reasonable to assume that agents possess higher preferences/beliefs
that are not changing over time? Perhaps we can appeal to intransigent beliefs
such as a belief in utilitarian welfare. However, utilitarian welfare does not pin
down a unique set of preferences. We may further postulate that the preferences
represented in section 3 are cardinal and are also in intrapersonally comparable
units as viewed by higher Isaac and that none of this changes over time. Aren’t
we simply moving the diﬃculty that arises by assuming invariability to another
level?
Consider the following example. An individual has to choose between x
and y in periods 1 and 2. Her preferences are as follows, in period 1 the most
preferred sequence of choices is (x, x) and in period 2 it is (x, x) conditional on
the period 1 self choosing x. It would appear that we can make an unambiguous
welfare claim that it is optimal for this individual to choose x in period 1 and
x in period 2. There is no need to appeal to the higher self who is temporally
impartial because temporal preferences are not changing.
Suppose however, that if the individual is forced9 to choose y in period 1
then her most preferred sequence in period 2 is (y, y). Which is the welfare
maximising sequence? Consider the following story. The choice x is smoking
and y is not smoking and parents are in a position to force a choice in period
1. The period 1 self holds the belief that smoking is good. The period 2 self
whose history is x maintains this belief. If her history is y however, she forms
the belief that smoking is bad. Suppose further that the belief that smoking is
good will give rise to the preference (x, x) Â (y, y) whereas the belief that it is
bad will reverse this preference. There is no reason to presume that preferences
and beliefs will be aligned in this way. Let us suppose that they are. In fact,
suppose that all higher order preferences are also aligned in this way. That
is, the belief that smoking is good gives rise to the second order preference
((x, x) Â (y, y)) Â ((y, y) Â (x, x)) and so on. If she is forced to choose y in
period 1 then there is an intertemporal conflict which is based on a change in
beliefs rather than on present bias. The temporally impartial self prefers (y, y)
in period 2 and (x, x) in period 1. Also, we no longer have a unique set of
period 2 preferences and beliefs. Depending on the history, the period 2 higher
8Note the distinction between this and higher order preferences which refers to preferences
over preferences.
9 Should the parent force his/her child to choose y in period 1? The parent’s decision will
be biased by his/her preferences, beliefs and morality.
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self will either believe that (x, x) is welfare maximising or that (y, y) is welfare
maximising.10 An appeal to utilitarian welfare does not help. Let us suppose
that there is some objective hedonic calculus that can be used to compare the
alternatives and (x, x) gives the greatest hedonic utilitarian welfare. However,
we have not supposed that the period 2 higher self with history y prefers (y, y)
because it maximises hedonic utilitarian welfare. Her beliefs are such that she
prefers (y, y). As with preferences, we take beliefs as given. Nor does it help
to imagine putting the individual in a position where she can compare belief
systems. A belief system is part of the entirety of an individual at a given point
in time. Any judgement made at any point in time will be made from the unique
perspective of the entirety that makes up that individual at that point in time.
We appealed to a temporally impartial higher self to deal with the problem of
temporal preferences changing. Are we to appeal to a higher, higher self who
is independent of changing beliefs? Our systems of thought are shaped by our
perceptions, social interactions, past choices and no doubt many other things.
Is it possible to rescue any semblance of an individual that is independent of
these influences? Are we to suppose that we can consider the preferences of an
empty shell?
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